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Abstract—The integration of Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) integrity augmentation functionalities in 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) has the potential to provide 
an integrity-augmented Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) solution 
suitable for cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. In this 
paper, we evaluate the opportunities offered by this 
integration, proposing a novel approach that maximizes the 
synergies between Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation 
(ABIA) and UAS cooperative/non- cooperative SAA 
architectures. When the specified collision risk thresholds are 
exceeded, an avoidance manoeuvre is performed by 
implementing a heading-based differential geometry or 
pseudospectral optimization to generate a set of optimal 
trajectory solutions free of mid-air conflicts. The optimal 
trajectory is selected using a cost function with minimum time 
constraints and fuel penalty criteria weighted for separation 
distance. The optimal avoidance trajectory also considers the 
constraints imposed by the ABIA in terms of UAS platform 
dynamics and GNSS satellite elevation angles (plus jamming 
avoidance when applicable), thus preventing degradation or 
loss of navigation data during the Track, Decision and 
Avoidance (TDA) process. The performance of this Integrity-
Augmented SAA (IAS) architecture was evaluated by 
simulation case studies involving cooperative and non-
cooperative platforms. Simulation results demonstrate that the 
proposed IAS architecture is capable of performing high-
integrity conflict detection and resolution when GNSS is used 
as the primary source of navigation data. 
Keywords—Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation, 
Unmanned Aircraft, Sense-and-Avoid, Obstacle Detection, 
Obstacle Avoidance and Global Navigation Satellite System. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
into non-segregated airspace presents a series of safety 
challenges [1]. One of the main challenges is the provision of 
a certifiable Sense- And-Avoid (SAA) capability. In addition 
to Space Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) and Ground 
Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS), Global Navigation 
Satellite System (GNSS) another form of augmentation has 
been developed that exploits the information provided by 
other avionic systems. In most cases, the additional avionic 
systems operate via separate principles than the GNSS and, 
therefore, are not subject to the same sources of error or 
interference. A system such as this is referred to as Avionics- 
Based or Aircraft-Based Augmentation System (ABAS). The 
ABAS approach is particularly well suited to increase the 
levels of integrity and accuracy (as well as continuity in 
multi-sensor data fusion architectures) of GNSS in a variety 
of mission- and safety-critical aviation applications. In 
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) applications, airworthiness 
requirements for both cooperative and non-cooperative 
Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) impose stringent GNSS data 
integrity requirements. Therefore, a properly designed and 
certifiable Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) 
capability would allow an extended spectrum of autonomous 
and safety-critical operations by continuously monitoring 
GNSS integrity levels and providing suitable caution and 
warning signals to the remote pilot or to the avionics flight 
control systems in order to accomplish GNSS-based mission 
and safety-critical tasks. This increased level of integrity 
could provide a pathway to support the unrestricted access of 
UAS to commercial airspace. Although current and likely 
future SBAS/GBAS augmentation systems can provide 
significant improvement of GNSS navigation performance, a 
properly designed and flight certified ABAS/ABIA system 
could play a key role in GNSS integrity augmentation for 
aviation safety-critical applications, including UAS SAA. 
Furthermore, using suitable data link and data processing 
technologies on the ground, a certified ABAS capability 
could be a core element of a future GNSS Space-Ground-
Avionics Augmentation Network (SGAAN). 
II. ABIA SYSTEM RESEARCH 
Previous research on ABIA systems demonstrated the 
potential of this technology to enhance GNSS integrity 
performance in a variety of mission- and safety-critical 
applications including experimental flight test/flight 
inspection, precision approach and automatic landing [2-5]. 
Therefore, an advanced ABIA system was developed for 
UAS applications (Fig. 1). In this system, the on-board 
sensors provide information on the aircraft relevant flight 
parameters (navigation data, engine settings, etc.) to an 
Integrity Flag Generator (IFG), which is also connected to 
the GNSS system. Using the available data on GNSS and 
the relevant Unmanned Aircraft (UA) flight parameters, 
integrity signals are generated which can be sent to the UAS 
Ground Control Station (GCS) or used by a Flight Path 
Optimisation Module (FPOM). This system addresses both 
the predictive and reactive nature of GNSS integrity 
augmentation by producing suitable integrity flags (cautions 
and warnings) in case of predicted/ascertained GNSS data 
losses or unacceptable signal degradations exceeding the 
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) specified for each 
phase of flight, and providing guidance information to the 
remote pilot/autopilot to avoid further data 
losses/degradations. 
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Fig. 1.  ABIA system architecture for UAS applications. 
 
To achieve this, the Integrity Flag Generator (IFG) module 
produces the following integrity flags [2-4]: 
 Caution Integrity Flag (CIF): a predictive annunciation 
that the GNSS data delivered to the avionics system is 
going to exceed the RNP thresholds specified for the 
current and planned flight operational tasks (alert status). 
 Warning Integrity Flag (WIF): a reactive annunciation 
that the GNSS data delivered to the avionics system has 
exceeded the RNP thresholds specified for the current 
flight operational task (fault status). 
The following definitions of Time-to-Alert (TTA) are 
applicable to the ABIA system [2-4]: 
 ABIA Time-to-Caution (TTC): the minimum time 
allowed for the caution flag to be provided to the user 
before the onset of a GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe 
condition. 
 ABIA Time-to-Warning (TTW): the maximum time 
allowed from the moment a GNSS fault resulting in an 
unsafe condition is detected to the moment that the 
ABIA system provides a warning flag to the user. 
III. ABIA INTEGRITY FLAG GENERATOR 
The main causes of GNSS data degradation or signal 
losses in aviation applications were deeply analysed in [2] 
and are listed below:  
 Antenna obscuration (i.e., obstructions from the wings, 
fuselage or empennage during maneuvers); 
 Adverse satellite geometry, resulting in high Position 
Dilution of Precision (PDOP); 
 Fading, resulting in reduced carrier to noise ratios 
(C/N0); 
 Doppler shift, impacting signal tracking and 
acquisition/reacquisition time; 
 Multipath effects,  leading to a reduced C/N0 and to  
range/phase errors; 
 Interference and jamming. 
Understanding the physics of these phenomena and 
developing reliable mathematical models was essential in 
order to properly design the ABIA IFG module [2]. Fig. 2 
shows the architecture of the IFG module and its interfaces. 
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Fig. 2.  ABIA IFG module architecture. 
The The ABIA IFG module is designed to provide CIF 
and WIF alerts in real-time (i.e., in accordance with the 
specified TTC and TTW requirements in all relevant flight 
phases). IFG module inputs are from the GNSS receiver and 
other aircraft sensors. The GNSS and Sensors Layer (GSL) 
passes the aircraft Position, Velocity, Time (PVT) and 
attitude (Euler angles) data (from the on board Inertial 
Navigation Systems, Air Data Computer, etc.), GNSS data 
(raw measurements and PVT) and the Flight Control System 
(FCS) actuators data to the Data Extraction Layer (DEL). At 
this stage, the required Navigation and Flight Dynamics 
(NFD) and GNSS Constellation Data (GCD) are extracted, 
together with the relevant information from an aircraft 
Three-Dimensional Model (3DM) and from a Terrain and 
Objects Database (TOD). The 3DM database is a detailed 
geometric model of the aircraft built in a Computer Aided 
Three-dimensional Interactive Application (CATIA). The 
TOD uses a Digital Terrain Elevation Database (DTED) and 
additional manmade objects data to obtain a detailed map of 
the surfaces neighbouring the aircraft. In the Integrity 
Processing Layer (IPL), the Doppler Analysis Module 
(DAM) calculates the Doppler shift by processing the NFD 
and GCD inputs. The Multipath Analysis Module (MAM) 
processes the 3DM, TOD, GNSS Constellation Module 
(GCM) and A/C Navigation/Dynamics Module (ADM) 
inputs to determine multipath contributions from the aircraft 
(wings/fuselage) and from the terrain/objects close to the 
aircraft. The Obscuration Analysis Module (OAM) receives 
inputs from the 3DM, GCS and ADS, and computes the 
GNSS antenna obscuration matrices corresponding to the 
various aircraft manoeuvres. The Signal Analysis Module 
(SAM) calculate the link budget of the direct GNSS signals 
received by the aircraft in the presence of atmospheric 
propagation disturbances (C/N0), as well as the applicable 
radio frequency interference and Jamming-to-Signal ratio 
(J/S) levels. The Integrity Flags Layer (IFL) uses a set of 
predefined CIF/WIF threshold parameters to trigger the 
generation of both caution and warning flags associated 
with antenna obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, carrier, 
interference and satellite geometry degradations. The 
approach adopted to set-up thresholds for the ABIA CIF and 
WIF integrity flags is depicted in Fig. 3. Both Scalar 
Tracking Loops (STL) and Vector Tracking Loops (VTL) 
are considered. 
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Fig. 3.  Integrity flag thresholds. 
 
The masking integrity flag criteria are the following: 
 When the current aircraft manoeuvre will lead to less the 
4 satellite in view, the CIF shall be generated. 
 When less than 4 satellites are in view, the WIF shall be 
generated. 
Additionally, when only four satellites are in view: 
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle (antenna 
frame) is less than 10 degrees, the caution integrity flag 
shall be generated. 
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle is less 
than 5 degrees, the warning integrity flag shall be 
generated. 
From the definition of Dilution of Precision (DOP) 
factors, GNSS accuracy can be expressed by [6]: 
                                         (1) 
where    is the standard deviation of the positioning 
accuracy and       is the standard deviation of the satellite 
pseudorange measurement error.  For the C/A-code       is 
in the order of 33.3m.  Therefore, the 1-sigma Estimated 
Position, Horizontal and Vertical Errors of a GNSS receiver 
can be calculated using the PDOP (EPE in 3D), the HDOP 
(EHE in 2D) or the VDOP (EVE).  In order to generate 
CIFs and WIFs that are consistent with current GNSS RNP, 
we need to introduce the Horizontal and Vertical Accuracy 
(HA/VA) requirements in the various flight phases. The 
Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) is the radius of a circle in the 
horizontal plane, with its centre being at the true position, 
which describes the region which is required to contain the 
indicated horizontal position with the required probability 
for a particular navigation mode. Similarly, the Vertical 
Alert Limit (VAL) is half the length of a segment on the 
vertical axis, with its centre being at the true position, which 
describes the region which is required to contain the 
indicated vertical position with the required probability for a 
particular navigation mode. As a result of our discussion, 
the DOP integrity flags criteria are the following: 
 When the EHE exceeds the HA 95% or the VA 95% 
alert requirements, the CIF shall be generated. 
 When the EHE exceeds the HAL or the EVE exceeds 
the VAL, the WIF shall be generated. 
During the landing phase, a GNSS Landing System 
(GLS) is augmented by GBAS in order to achieve RNP 
levels, as well as Lateral and Vertical Protection Levels 
(LPL and VPL).  LPL/VPL is defined as the statistical error 
value that bounds the Lateral/Vertical Navigation System 
Error (NSE) with a specified level of confidence.  In 
particular, Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) allows 
for multiple Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) 
reference receivers (up to four) to be implemented. The 
lateral and vertical accuracy (NSE 95%) and alert limits 
required by a GLS in the presence of LAAS, considering the 
continuously varying position of the aircraft with respect to 
the Landing Threshold Point (LTP) are given in [7]. 
Additionally, [7] provides the so-called Continuity of 
Protection Levels in terms of Predicted Lateral and Vertical 
Protection Levels (PLPL and PVPL).  Although the 
definition in [7] is quite comprehensive, a generic statement 
is made that the PVPL and PLPL computations shall be 
based on the ranging sources expected to be available for the 
duration of the approach.  In other terms, it is implied that 
the airborne subsystem shall determine which ranging 
sources are expected to be available, including the ground 
subsystem’s declaration of satellite differential correction 
availability (satellite setting information). Unfortunately, this 
generic definition does not address the various conditions for 
satellite signal losses associated to specific aircraft 
manoeuvres (including curved GLS precision approaches). 
Therefore, it is suggested that an extended definition of 
PLPL and PVPL is developed taking into account the 
continuously varying aircraft-satellite relative geometry 
(masking envelope).  In particular, when the current aircraft 
manoeuvre will lead to less than 4 satellites in view or 
unacceptable accuracy degradations, the CIF shall be 
generated. Under these assumptions, the criteria for 
producing SBAS/GBAS CIFs and WIFs are: 
 When the PLPLGBAS/SBAS exceeds LPL or PVPLGBAS/SBAS 
exceeds the VPL, the CIF shall be generated. 
 When the LPLGBAS/SBAS exceeds the LPL or the 
VPLGBAS/SBAS exceeds the VPL, the WIF shall be 
generated. 
Multipath integrity flags were defined using the Early-
Late Phase (ELP) observable and the range error [8].  As 
described in [3], the multipath integrity flags criteria are the 
following: 
 When the ELP exceeds 0.1 radians, the caution integrity 
flag shall be generated. 
 When the multipath range error exceeds 1 meter, the 
warning integrity flag shall be generated. 
In order to define the integrity thresholds associated with 
Doppler and fading effects, a dedicated analysis of the GNSS 
receiver tracking performance was required. When the 
GNSS measurement errors exceed certain thresholds, the 
receiver loses lock to the satellites. Since both the code and 
carrier tracking loops are nonlinear, especially near the 
threshold regions, only Monte Carlo simulations of the 
GNSS receiver in different dynamics and Signal-to-Noise 
Ratio (SNR) conditions can determine the receiver tracking 
performance [6, 9, 10].  Nevertheless, some conservative 
rule of thumbs that approximate the measurement errors of 
the GNSS tracking loops can be used.  Numerous sources of 
measurement errors affect the Phase Lock Loop (PLL) and 
the Frequency Lock Loop (FLL).  However, for our 
purposes, it is sufficient to analyze the dominant error 
sources in each type of tracking loop. Considering a typical 
GNSS receivers employing a two-quadrant arctangent 
discriminator, the PLL threshold is given by [6]: 
               
                          (2) 
where: 
     = 1-sigma phase jitter from all sources except dynamic 
stress error; 
     = dynamic stress error in the PLL tracking loop. 
 
Frequency jitter due to thermal noise and dynamic stress 
error are the main errors in a GNSS receiver FLL. The 
receiver tracking threshold is such that the 3-sigma jitter 
must not exceed one-fourth of the frequency pull-in range of 
the FLL discriminator. Therefore, the FLL threshold is [6]: 
                                       (3) 
where: 
3     = 3-sigma thermal noise frequency jitter; 
       = dynamic stress error in the FLL tracking loop. 
 
Regarding the code tracking loop, a conservative rule-of-
thumb for the Delay Lock Loop (DLL) tracking threshold is 
that the 3-sigma value of the jitter due to all sources of loop 
stress must not exceed the correlator spacing (d), expressed 
in chips. Therefore [6]: 
                                           (4) 
where: 
      = 1-sigma thermal noise code tracking jitter; 
Re          = dynamic stress error in the DLL. 
 
The Phase Lock Loop (PLL), FLL and DLL error models 
described in [2] allow determining the      corresponding 
to the receiver tracking thresholds. The integrity flag 
criterion applicable to the ABIA system is: 
(
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]   (5)  
where: 
         = Minimum      for PLL tracking; 
         = Minimum      for FLL tracking; 
         = Minimum      for DLL tracking. 
 
Numerical solutions of Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) show that the 
weak link in unaided avionics GNSS receivers is the carrier 
tracking loop threshold (greater sensitivity to dynamics 
stress).  Therefore, the           threshold can be adopted 
in these cases.  In general, when the PLL loop order is made 
higher, there is an improvement in dynamic stress 
performance.  Therefore, third order PLL are widely adopted 
in avionics GNSS receivers.  Assuming 15 to 18 Hz noise 
bandwidth and 5 to 20 msec predetection integration time 
(typical values for avionics receivers), the rule-of-thumb 
tracking threshold for the PLL gives 25 to 28 dB-Hz.  
Additionally, in aided avionics receiver applications, the 
PLL tracking threshold can be significantly reduced by using 
external velocity aiding in the carrier tracking loop.  With 
this provision, a tracking threshold of approximately 15 to 18 
dB-Hz can be achieved.  Using these theoretical and 
experimental threshold values, we can also calculate the 
receiver Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) performance for the 
various cases of practical interest, as described in [3].  When 
available, flight test data collected in representative portions 
of the aircraft operational flight envelope (or the results of 
Monte Carlo simulation) shall be used.  Taking an additional 
5% margin on the 3-sigma tracking thresholds for the CIF, 
the following additional criteria are introduced for the ABIA 
integrity thresholds: 
 When either                
             
                              the CIF shall be 
generated. 
 When either         
 or            or       
  the WIF shall be generated. 
In avionics receivers, lock detectors are used to assess if 
the satellite signals are being tracked or not tracked.  Code 
lock detection is very similar to estimating the received 
    , inferring that the receiver is operating on or near the 
correlation peak.  Knowledge of code lock is obviously 
parallel to the knowledge of received signal power. The 
receiver’s code-correlation process has to raise the signal out 
of the noise. The spread spectrum processing gain (  ) is 
defined as the ratio of the spread bandwidth to the unspread 
(baseband) bandwidth and is expressed in dB. The post-
correlation signal-to-noise ratio can be calculated by: 
                                             (6) 
When the receiver code is aligned with the transmitted 
code, the signal power at the band pass output is crushed 
into approximately 100 Hz of bandwidth.  The processing 
gain can be calculated from: 
            ( 
   
  
)                             (7) 
where CR is the chipping rate and TD is the data period.  For 
the C/A-code this works out to be about 43 dB.  The 
TORNADO-IDS receiver has a cut off value at 10 dB, which 
means that if the value is less than this the satellite signal 
level is too low to be used in the positioning computations 
[11].  Therefore, an additional threshold to be accounted for 
is: 
                                                      (8) 
During experimental flight test activities performed with 
unaided L1 C/A code avionics receivers, it was also found 
that, in a variety of dynamics conditions, a      of 25 dB-
Hz was sufficient to keep tracking of the satellites [12].  
Consequently, taking a 2 dB margin for the CIF, the 
following additional criteria are adopted for the TORNADO 
S/N integrity flags: 
 When the      is less than 27dB-Hz or the difference 
between the S/N and the processing gain is less than 12 
dB, the CIF shall be generated. 
 When the      is less than 25dB-Hz or the difference 
between the S/N and the processing gain is less than 10 
dB, the WIF shall be generated.  
Interference detection in a GNSS receiver is typically 
performed based on a number of parameters including 
output power, variance and standard deviation of the output 
power (correlated), carrier phase uncertainty and Automatic 
Gain Control (AGC) values. The key component to detect 
interference in the received signal is the Automatic Gain 
Control (AGC). In order to minimize the signal loss, the 
amplitude of the received GNSS signal is tuned to the ADC 
range. The gain in AGC drops significantly when there is an 
increased power in the GNSS bandwidth. The chirp signals 
are predominantly used for jamming in the recent times. 
Chirp signals are typically sinusoidal or cosine signals with 
sweeping of frequency within in-band GNSS frequency 
ranges. The chirp signals are modelled using a periodic 
Frequency Modulated (FM) signal and can be expressed as 
[12, 13]: 
             ∑ ∫      
 
 
 
 
   
           
    
 ∫      
  
 
 
         
                            (9) 
where     
          is the 1
st
 saw tooth function,        
    
         is the n
th
 saw tooth function,     is the sweep 
time. A number of algorithms have been proposed for 
jamming detection, localisation and characterisation of 
interfering signals. Considering a GNSS jammer transmitting 
chirp signals (with zero mean) from a random position, the 
received signal can be expressed as [14]: 
           √ 
 
      
                            (10)                             
where       is the transmitted jammer signal,    is the carrier 
signal,   is the distance between the jammer and the 
receiver,   is the path loss and c is the speed of light. In order 
to improve the hostile effects of GNSS in electronic warfare 
and terrorist attacks, new generation signals are being 
introduced. These signals inherently possess higher precision 
of orientation and anti-jamming performance, and are also 
compatible existing GNSS signals. Binary Offset Carrier 
(BOC) modulation is introduced to increase the ERP for anti-
jamming performance without affecting the existing GNSS 
signals. In these cases, Costas loop is used as carrier tracking 
loop to receive BOC modulated signals. When a jamming 
signal interferes with the GNSS signal, phase measurement 
error increases beyond a specified threshold value and as a 
consequence the tracking loop loses lock. The design of the 
GNSS antenna generally provides a superior polarization 
signal reception and poor low elevation angle gain. As a 
result of superior polarisation, cross polarisation reception is 
less than - 10dBic and thus effectively reduces unwanted 
signal reflections. In order to design GNSS receivers against 
interference, bandwidth, sampling and hardware 
considerations are taken into account. In order to increase the 
accuracy of the signal, narrow correlator spacing is 
employed by sharpening up the auto correlation function. 
Therefore, it is ensured that the correlators are still operating 
in a linear range. Noise increases due to the increase in pre-
correlation bandwidth but it can effectively tackled by 
employing superior digital signal processing algorithms. 
Generally, the signal processor adopted has the capability of 
performing code correlation in two different modes: an early 
minus-late power mode and a dot-product mode. The signal 
processor has two correlators in each channel and can 
operate one of the correlators as an early or an early-minus-
late correlator. The normalised dot-product discriminator is 
given by [14]:  
   
             
  
    
                          (11)                                           
where I and Q values are summed over the Prediction 
Integration Interval (PDI).      and      represent the I and 
Q values when the hardware in implemented in the dot-
product mode. P stands for I and Q and are similar to the 
ones used in carrier loop discriminators. For an infinite pre-
correlation bandwidth, the normalised Early-minus-Late 
(EL) discriminator has an output at high values of SNR and 
the estimation is given by: 
      
       
          
 chips, -d/2≤   ≤ d/2        (12)                               
where   is the tracking error and   is the EL discriminator 
spacing in chips. The standard deviation of the pseudorange 
observations (    is estimated from the discriminator output 
standard deviation (    and is given by: 
   
√   
  
                              (13)                                                 
where    is the gain of the discriminator and   is the 
bandwidth. For example, for a loop bandwidth of 1/30 Hz, 
the resulting    is approximately 0.3 cycles. In avionics 
receivers, lock detectors are used to assess if the satellite 
signals are being tracked or not tracked.  Code lock 
detection is adopted, which is very similar to estimating the 
received     , inferring that the receiver is operating on or 
near the correlation peak. The code-correlation process of 
the receiver is designed to increase the signal strength when 
compared to that of inherent and added noise. The spread 
spectrum processing gain (  ) is defined as the ratio of the 
spread bandwidth to the unspread (baseband) bandwidth and 
is expressed in dB. The post-correlation     is given as: 
                                           (14)                               
When the receiver code is aligned with the transmitted 
code, the signal power at the band pass output is crushed 
into approximately 100 Hz of bandwidth. The processing 
gain can be calculated from: 
        ( 
   
  
)                        (15)                                                    
where    is the chipping rate and    is the data period.  For 
the C/A code this works out to be about 43 dB.  Typical 
avionics receivers have a cut off value at 10 dB, which 
means that if the value is less than this the satellite signal 
level is too low to be used in the positioning computations 
[14]. An additional threshold criterion to be accounted for in 
the ABIA system is given as: 
                                          (16)                               
 When    is more than 11 dB (margin of 1 dB), the CIF 
shall be generated. 
 When    is less than 9 dB (margin of 1 dB), the WIF 
shall be generated. 
IV. ABIA FLIGHT PATH OPTIMISATION MODULE 
Optimising a trajectory for integrity based navigation is 
a standard optimisation problem that can be solve like all 
optimal control problem using a variety of direct or indirect 
derived methods. The optimisation problem is depicted in 
Fig. 4. All the standard components of an optimization 
problem are used. A flight dynamic model of the aircraft 
gives the dynamic constraints and allows creating a 
trajectory that will be flyable by the aircraft. The integrity 
degradations and the current GNSS parameters define a 
certain number of path constraints. They ensure that 
integrity degradations will be avoided on the whole 
trajectory. Then boundary conditions include minimal, 
maximal, initial and final values for the entire state and 
command variable. They are given by the aircraft sensors, 
which relate the current flight parameters, and by the Flight 
Management System (FMS), which gives the information 
from the flight plan. The cost function is the performance 
criterion to minimize. All the necessary constraint for the 
integrity degradations are already included in the path 
constraint, therefore the time is minimized. This choice is 
made for simplicity and because only the integrity 
navigation optimization is considered in this research, but 
more complex criterion could be set based on aircraft 
performances. 
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Fig. 4. Trajectory optimization problem. 
 
The Aircraft Dynamics Model (ADM) used is a three 
dimensional symmetric flight, unsteady model. A 3-Degree 
of Freedom (3-DoF) model with variable mass is adopted. 
The majority of the GNSS integrity degradations depend on 
the relative position of the GNSS receiver antenna and each 
satellite. The relative movement between the GNSS receiver 
antenna and the satellite is also crucial. Therefore 
degradations related to one satellite do not affect the system 
with the same manner or intensity as the others. A loss of 
integrity occurs if a combination of several degradations 
from different satellites takes place at the same instance. 
The CIF/WIF thresholds defined for the antenna 
obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, carrier, interference 
and satellite geometry degradations are precisely capable of 
detecting combination of such degradations. A potential CIF 
or WIF is produced based on the current values of the 
aircraft flight parameters (position, Euler angles, and 
velocity), the satellite parameters (position and velocity), 
and the given thresholds [3]. An individual CIF or WIF is 
produced with respect to each satellite of the constellation.  
An overall CIF is triggered if there are less than 5 satellites 
remaining without an individual CIF and an overall WIF is 
triggered if less than 4 satellites are remaining without an 
individual WIF. The flight path optimisation algorithm is 
initiated when degradation in integrity is predicted or 
detected by the IFG. The logical steps involved are listed 
below: 
 
 Step 1: The satellites in view that remain without an 
individual integrity flag are selected and their data are 
extracted (position, elevation, azimuth and other 
information). 
 Step 2: For each selected satellite, the type of flag is 
analysed: 
- If the flag is not due to Doppler shift, the minimum 
elevation limit is set with the current selected 
satellite’s elevation angle. 
- If the flag is due to Doppler shift, the sign of the 
azimuth angle is compared to the sign of the bank 
angle. If the satellite is located in the same direction 
of the track, the minimum elevation limit is set with 
the current satellite’s elevation value. If the satellite 
is located in the opposite direction of the track, the 
maximum elevation limit is set with the current 
satellite’s elevation value. 
 Step 3: After the satellite elevation limits are set, the 
parameters are used in the trajectory optimization suite. 
V. ABIA/SAA SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
Both cooperative and non-cooperative SAA systems are 
being developed to address UAS safe integration into the 
non-segregated airspace [1]. The SAA capability can be 
defined as the automatic detection of possible conflicts (i.e., 
collision threats) by the UA platform and the implementation 
of avoidance manoeuvres to prevent the identified collision 
threats. An analysis of the available SAA candidate 
technologies and the associated sensors was presented in 
[15]. An approach to the definition of encounter models and 
their applications on the SAA strategies is presented in             
[15, 16] considering both cooperative and non-cooperative 
scenarios. As part of our research, the possible synergies 
attainable with the adoption of different detection, tracking 
and trajectory generation algorithms were studied. 
Additionally, the error propagation from different sources 
and the impacts of host and intruders dynamics on the 
ultimate SAA solution were investigated [15]. SAA system 
requirements can be derived from the current regulations 
applicable for the human pilot see-and-avoid capability            
[17-22]. The proposed ABIA/SAA integrated architecture is 
illustrated in Fig. 5. The Position, Velocity and Attitude 
(PVA) measurements are typically obtained by adopting 
multi-sensor data fusion techniques [23 -25]. An initial flight 
path is generated using the aircraft dynamics model. The IFG 
module run is performed on that trajectory. Based on a 
Boolean decision logic that sorts sensors’ data based on 
estimated performance parameters, the C-SAA or non-
cooperative SAA sensors are used for safe separation. If both 
the safe separation thresholds are violated and a mid-air 
collision threat is detected the WIF is generated. To prevent 
any WIF, the flight path optimization process starts when the 
first CIF is generated. Pseudo-Spectral Optimisation (PSO) 
and Differential Geometry Optimization (DGO) techniques 
are used to generate a new optimised trajectory free of any 
integrity degradations. Depending on the relationship 
between the available time-to-collision and the computation 
time PSO and DGO trajectory solutions, the optimised 
trajectory data are sent to the AFCS (and/or to the ground 
pilot) for execution of the avoidance manoeuvres. In the 
trajectory optimisation process time is used as the cost 
functional and the aircraft dynamics model/satellite 
elevations are used as path constraints. The selection of the 
optimal trajectory from the generated set of safe trajectories 
is performed, which is then fed to the aircraft guidance 
subsystems. The implemented decision logic is based on 
minimisation of the following cost function [26, 27]: 
             ∫                      
     ∫                                  (17) 
where: 
      is the estimated distance of the generated avoidance 
trajectory points from the avoidance volume associated 
with the obstacle. 
                is the estimated minimum distance of 
the avoidance trajectory from the avoidance volume. 
        |     is the time at which the safe avoidance 
condition is successfully attained. 
      
  
 
    is the specific fuel consumption. 
      is the thrust profile. 
               are the weightings attributed to time, 
fuel, distance and integral distance respectively. 
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Fig. 5. ABIA/DAA integrated architecture. 
VI. SIMULATION ACTIVITIES 
A number of simulation case studies were performed to 
evaluate the performance of the ABIA/SAA integrated 
architecture. A GNSS constellation simulator was 
implemented to support GNSS satellite visibility, signal and 
geometry analysis. Using CATIA-P3, a detailed aircraft 3-
Dimensional Model (3DM) was developed and an Aircraft 
Dynamics Simulator (ADS) was implemented to generate 
the nominal flight path trajectory and Euler angles. Terrain 
and Objects Data (TOD) was used to run the MPS and using 
a DTED, it a detailed map of the terrain beneath the aircraft 
was obtained. Providing the aircraft trajectory inputs from 
the ADS module, terrain elevation data were automatically 
extracted and fed to the TOM module where they are 
integrated with the database of man-made objects (e.g., 
buildings). The Doppler Simulator Module (DSM) was used 
to calculate the Doppler shift by processing ADS and GCS 
inputs. The Multipath Analysis Module (MAM) processed 
the 3DM, TEM, GCS and ADS inputs to determine 
multipath contributions from the aircraft (wings/fuselage) 
and from the terrain/objects close to the aircraft. The 
Obscuration Analysis Module (OAM), and was used to 
compute the GNSS antenna(e) masking matrixes for all 
aircraft manoeuvres with inputs from the 3DM, GCS and 
ADS. The nominal link budget of the direct GNSS signals 
received by the aircraft in the presence of ionospheric and 
tropospheric propagation disturbances was evaluated using 
SAM. The Integrity Flags Simulator (IFS) used a set of 
predefined threshold parameters to trigger the generation of 
both caution and warning flags associated with antenna 
obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, SNR and satellite 
geometry degradations. The GNSS constellation simulator 
(GCS) was developed to calculate GNSS satellite position 
and velocity in the Earth-Centred Earth-Fixed (ECEF) 
reference frame and to obtain satellite visibility data. The 
satellite position and velocity are calculated from the 
Kepler's laws of orbital motion using either the YUMA or 
SEM almanac data [28, 29]. Various geometric parameters 
were extracted from the literature to draw a detailed CATIA 
model of the AEROSONDE UA [30-34]. The ABIA 
integration into an existing UAS SAA architecture was 
studied in cooperative and non-cooperative SAA scenarios. 
The ABIA host platform used in the simulation was the 
AEROSONDE UA and the intruders platforms included 
AIRBUS 320 (A320) and AEROSONDE UAs. The AMMs 
in pitch and roll are generated calculating all possible 
intersections of the aircraft body (all triangular surfaces) 
with the LOS antenna-satellites (Fig. 6). 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  AEROSONDE masking profile simulation.  
In all the simulated scenarios, an avoidance volume (sum 
of navigation and tracking errors) was generated by the SAA 
system [15]. Pseudospectral (PSO) or constrained differential 
geometric optimization (DGO) techniques were used to 
generate the new trajectory based on the available time to 
conflict (host entering the avoidance volume). The avoidance 
trajectory was initiated by the SAA system when the 
probability of collision exceeded the required threshold 
value. Time and fuel were used in the cost functional, the 
dynamic model as dynamic constraint, and the elevation 
criteria as path constraints for both PSO and DGO 
techniques. Boundary conditions were set from the value of 
the flight parameters at CIF time step. Fig. 7 illustrates the 
cooperative SAA test scenario wherein AEROSONDE 
(ABIA host platform) UA and two intruders (AEROSONDE 
UAs) are on the same FL. One intruder UA is 90° off track 
and the other is on a head-on collision with the host UA. The 
horizontal and vertical separation obtained with respect to 
intruder 1 and 2 are illustrated in Fig. 8 and 9 respectively. 
Three different points are shown on the ABIA/SAA host 
platform trajectory in Fig. 7: 
 SAA Break-off Point: Corresponding to the point where 
the host UA initiates the avoidance trajectory 
(commanded by the SAA system). The cost function 
criteria adopted in this case is minimum time. 
 SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point:  Corresponding to the 
point where the host RPAS can manoeuvre safely (any 
manoeuvre within its operational flight envelope) has 0 
ROC.  From this point onwards the SAA cost function 
criteria switches to minimum time and minimum fuel to 
get back on the original (desired) track. 
 ABIA Re-join Point: corresponding to the point where 
the host UA re-joins the original (desired) track without 
GNSS data degradations. 
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SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point
ABIA Re-join Point
Host Platform ABIA/DAA
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Fig. 7. Cooperative SAA scenario (3UAS). 
 
The simulation results demonstrate that the ABIA IFG 
module is capable of generating integrity flags to provide 
both caution and warning signals when GNSS signals are 
degraded or lost. After the integrity caution flag is generated, 
the time available for the pilot/autopilot to react (before the 
integrity event is detected and the warning flag is generated), 
is at least 2 seconds. This TTC can support safety-critical 
tasks including GLS curved/segmented precision approach 
and automatic landing applications. Data analysis showed 
that the ABIA system can provide useful integrity signals for 
CAT-III precision approach and automatic landing. 
 
Fig. 8. Obtained horizontal and vertical separation of intruder 1. 
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Fig. 9. Obtained horizontal and vertical separation of intruder 2. 
 
In the C-SAA and N-SAA scenarios investigated and in 
the dynamic conditions explored, all near mid-air collision   
threats were successfully avoided by implementing adequate 
trajectory optimisation algorithms. Both PSO and DGO 
algorithms proved successful in C-SAA and N-SAA 
scenarios depending on the available time for the 
optimisation loops (distance host-intruders and relative 
dynamics). Simulation case studies to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed GNSS ABIA integrity 
augmentation strategy were performed in a number of test 
platforms (3-DoF and 6-DoF aircraft dynamics models) 
including AIRBUS 320 (A320), TORNADO-IDS and 
AEROSONDE UA. In all scenarios including multipath 
environments [15], an overall avoidance volume is generated 
based on the SAA Unified Method (SUM) proposed in [15]. 
Time and fuel are used in the cost functional, the aircraft 
dynamics model produces the dynamics constraints, and the 
satellite elevation criteria are used to set path constraints for 
both PSO and DGO techniques [5]. Based on the obtained 
position uncertainty about the host manned aircraft or UA 
trajectory, an optimised avoidance trajectory without any 
GNSS data losses is constructed around the overall 
avoidance volume obtained by combining the jamming 
signal radiation pattern and navigation error of the host 
platform. The optimised avoidance trajectory is constructed 
tangential to the radiation pattern of the jammer (main lobe 
in the case of directional jammer). The optimised avoidance 
trajectory obtained in the presence of a directional jammer is 
illustrated in Fig. 10. 
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Fig. 10. Avoidance trajectory in the presence of directional jammer. 
 
The results of a simulation performed in 
MATLAB/Simulink for the directional jammer case are 
illustrated in Fig. 11. The AEROSONDE 6-DoF dynamics 
model is used for this case study. After jamming detection 
and generation of a CIF, an optimised avoidance trajectory is 
generated. This is based on the cost function approach 
defined earlier and the constraints imposed by ABIA in 
terms of UA platform dynamics and GNSS satellite elevation 
angles. The avoidance trajectory guarantees jamming 
avoidance while preventing degradation or losses of GNSS 
navigation data. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Trajectory in the presence of directional jammer. 
VII. SIMULATION ACTIVITIES 
The synergies between a GNSS Avionics Based Integrity 
Augmentation (ABIA) system and a novel Unmanned Aerial 
System (UAS) Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) architecture for 
cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios were explored. 
The integration of ABIA with SAA leads to an Integrity 
Augmented SAA (IAS) solution supporting the efforts 
towards a safe and unrestricted access of UAS to commercial 
airspace. The ABIA and SAA research activities were 
presented and a detailed ABIA/SAA integrated architecture 
was established. Simulation case studies were performed for 
IFG, IFG/FPM and ABIA/SAA modules. According to the 
simulation results, after the integrity caution flag is 
generated, the time available for the pilot/autopilot to react 
(before the integrity warning flag is generated), is sufficient 
for safety-critical tasks including GLS curved/segmented 
precision approach and automatic landing applications. The 
ABIA integration into an existing UAS SAA architecture 
proved that all near mid-air collision threats were 
successfully avoided by implementing trajectory 
optimisation algorithms. The proposed ABIA/SAA 
integration architecture can achieve adequate performance 
by avoiding critical satellite signal losses while fulfilling the 
separation requirements for SAA. Current research is 
extending the ABAS/ABIA concepts to the Aeronautical 
Data Link (ADL) application domain, also investigating 
ABIA LOS and BLOS communications interfaces for UAS 
applications. Additionally, ABIA evolutions for Next 
Generation Flight Management Systems (NG-FMS) and 
ground-based Four-Dimensional Trajectory (4DT) Air 
Traffic Management (ATM) systems are being addressed 
[35-39]. Finally, possible extensions of the ABIA concept to 
aviation mission planning and forensic (accident 
investigation) applications are being investigated. 
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